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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Henry Gibbs appeals the district court's dismissal of his 
pro se civil rights complaint. The district court denied 
Gibbs' request for in forma pauperis status and dismissed 
the complaint pursuant to the "three strikes" provision of 
28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). For the reasons that follow, we will 
reverse and remand to the district court for a determination 
of whether Gibbs was in "imminent danger" at the time of 
the alleged incidents. 
 
I. 
 
On August 7, 1996, Gibbs filed a pro se civil rights 
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that 
Cross, a prison maintenance supervisor, was causing Gibbs 
to be subjected to dangerous conditions while confined to 
the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") at the State 
Correctional Institute at Somerset.1 Although it is not clear 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. By Order dated December 18, 1997, this Court appointed counsel to 
represent Mr. Gibbs. 
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from the complaint, it appears that Gibbs spent at least 
several months in a cell in the RHU. He claims that during 
this time "dust, lint and shower odor" were continuously 
emitted from the cell vent, causing Gibbs to suffer"severe 
headaches, change in voice, mucus that is full of dust and 
lint, and watery eyes." Appellant's Br. at 6. Gibbs alleges 
that prison personnel have not responded to his requests to 
address this situation and that he therefore filed this action 
seeking monetary damages. When Gibbs filed the action he 
remained housed in the RHU. 
 
Gibbs' complaint was accompanied by a motion seeking 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case was referred to 
a magistrate judge who determined that Gibbs had 
previously filed at least three civil actions that had been 
dismissed as frivolous and that he was therefore ineligible 
to proceed in forma pauperis because of the recently 
enacted provisions of 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). The magistrate 
judge further determined that "although [Gibbs] allege[d] 
that his health suffered from the dust, lint, and odors in 
his cell, the allegations of his complaint do not colorably 
raise a claim of imminent danger of serious physical injury" 
so as to fit within the exception to S 1915(g). Accordingly, 
the magistrate judge recommended that the motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis be denied and that the complaint 
be dismissed without prejudice to Gibbs' right to refile upon 
payment of the required filing fee. The district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's Report and 
Recommendation as the opinion of the court and dismissed 
the complaint. 
 
We granted Gibbs leave to appeal in forma pauperis in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. S 1915(b) and appointed counsel 
to assist him with this appeal. Because Cross had not been 
served with a copy of the complaint, we directed that 
relevant portions of the record be forwarded to the state's 
Attorney General to allow for participation in the appeal.2 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. When referencing the arguments presented on appeal by the state's 
Attorney General, we will refer throughout this opinion to the brief of 
appellee Cross although we are cognizant of the fact that Cross is not 
technically a party to this appeal since he was never served with a copy 
of the complaint. 
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addition, the United States intervened and has filed a brief 
defending the constitutionality of S 1915(g).3 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. We have appellate 
jurisdiction to review a final order of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the district 
court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) is plenary. See 
Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 85 (3d Cir. 1997); Moody v. 
Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 
II. 
 
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 S 801 ("PLRA") in 1996. One 
provision of the PLRA, often referred to as the "three 
strikes" provision, is at issue here. That provision is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) and provides as follows: 
 
       In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
       appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under 
       this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 
       occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 
       facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
       United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 
       it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 
       which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
       under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
 
The bar imposed by this provision does not preclude an 
inmate from bringing additional suits. It does, however, 
deny him or her the right to obtain in forma pauperis 
status. 
 
Gibbs does not dispute that he has accumulated at least 
three strikes.5 He argues instead that the "three strikes" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The United States takes no position with respect to the issue of 
whether Gibbs falls within the statutory exception to S 1915(g). 
 
5. We held in Keener v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 128 F.3d 
143 (3d Cir. 1997), that dismissals as frivolous prior to the PLRA's 
enactment count as strikes. Gibbs' "strike" history includes at least the 
following civil actions: Gibbs v. Sobina, No. 95-00150 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 
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provision should not bar him from proceeding in forma 
pauperis here because he has alleged "imminent danger of 
serious physical injury" within the exception contained in 
S 1915(g). Gibbs also asserts a constitutional challenge to 
28 U.S.C. S 1915(g), arguing that it denies indigent inmates 
their constitutional right of access to the courts, and denies 
them the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment. His constitutional claims were not raised in 
the district court. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district 
court erred in ruling that Gibbs was not eligible for in forma 
pauperis status as a matter of law, and we will therefore 
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. See Roman, 116 F.3d at 86. We will refrain 
from reaching the constitutional claims, but Gibbs is free to 
raise those on remand.5 
 
As noted above, prisoners who are in "imminent danger 
of serious physical injury" are exempted from the "three 
strikes" provision in 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Gibbs has alleged 
that he was forced to breathe particles of dust and lint 
which were continuously being dispersed into his cell 
through the ventilation system. By the time Gibbsfiled the 
underlying civil action in the district court, he had been 
living under these conditions for some time and claims to 
have been suffering from "severe headaches, change in 
voice, mucus that is full of dust and lint, and watery eyes." 
Gibbs argues that, depending on the nature of the particles 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1995) (dismissed as frivolous), appeal dismissed as frivolous, No. 95- 
3481 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 1995); Gibbs v. Monsour, No. 95-00167 (W.D. Pa. 
Aug. 25, 1995) (dismissed as frivolous); Gibbs v. Musser, No. 95-00227 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1995) (dismissed as frivolous), aff'd, No. 96-3031 (3d 
Cir. Dec. 31, 1996); Gibbs v. Tajeske, No. 95-00230 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 
1995) (dismissed as frivolous), appeal dismissed as frivolous, No. 96- 
3030 (3d Cir. April 4, 1996); Gibbs v. Sobina , No. 95-00255 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 29, 1995) (dismissed as frivolous), aff'd, No. 96-3029 (3d Cir. Dec. 
31, 1996). 
 
5. As we stated in Roman, "[s]ince Gibbs failed to raise these issues 
before the district court . . . we expressly decline to address or decide 
them here even though they have been briefed before us." 116 F.3d at 
87. 
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he is breathing, there is a significant possibility that he is 
under imminent danger of serious physical injury, and he 
thus falls within the statutory exception of S 1915(g). Cross, 
on the other hand, argues that the physical symptoms 
experienced by Gibbs are not "serious" within the meaning 
of S 1915(g). Counsel for Cross attempts to minimize Gibbs' 
allegations by emphasizing their speculative nature. 
 
       The Court should reject this invitation [to speculate]. 
       Obviously, if sheer bootstrapping conjecture of this 
       kind is sufficient to state an `imminent danger of 
       serious physical injury' - if it is enough for a prisoner 
       to say . . . that there is dust in his cell and for all he 
       knows it might be asbestos, . . . then the three strikes 
       rule will become a dead letter, a rule swallowed by its 
       exception. This cannot have been Congress' intention. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 15. 
 
However, Gibbs does not merely allege that he is in a 
dusty cell. He alleges that unidentified dust particles were 
in his lungs and mucus, and that he is suffering from 
severe headaches, watery eyes, and a change in his voice as 
a result. See A. 16-17. We are unimpressed with appellee's 
attempt to minimize such allegations by emphasizing their 
speculative nature. Inmates ought to be able to complain of 
unsafe drinking water without awaiting the onset of 
dysentery. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480-81 
(1993). ( "a prison inmate also could successfully complain 
about demonstrably unsafe drinking water without waiting 
for an attack of dysentery.") Inmates ought to be able to 
complain about "unsafe, life-threatening condition[s] in 
their prison" without waiting for something to happen to 
them.). After all, it is the prison administration, not the 
inmates, who are in the best position to determine the 
precise nature of any such contaminants in those 
situations where health hazards are not readily apparent to 
the unaided senses. 
 
Thus, in Gibbs v. Roman, we instructed district courts to 
evaluate the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se 
prisoner facing a S 1915(g) bar under our liberal pleading 
rules, construing all allegations in favor of the complainant 
and crediting those allegations of "imminent danger" that 
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have gone unchallenged. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d at 86. 
Here, neither the magistrate judge, nor the district court 
judge had the benefit of that ruling, and neither judge 
credited Gibbs' allegations regarding the conditions in the 
RHU. 
 
Moreover, notwithstanding appellee's rejoinder, it is 
common knowledge that improper ventilation and the 
inhalation of dust and lint particles can cause disease. For 
example, the dangers posed by exposure to friable asbestos 
are all too well known. See, e.g., LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 
F.3d 68, 74 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) ("friable asbestos poses a 
significant health risk because airborne particles can 
become lodged in lungs and in the respiratory tract and 
over time can lead to asbestosis, mesothelioma and lung 
cancer"). 
 
Cross bases much of his argument to the contrary upon 
several cases wherein courts have determined that 
symptoms such as headaches and nausea do not amount 
to a serious physical injury or that exposure to friable 
asbestos does not amount to a physical injury at all absent 
some manifestation of asbestosis symptomatology.6 
However, these cases were decided under an Eighth 
Amendment analysis, and that is quite different from the 
statutory analysis required under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). An 
Eighth Amendment claim requires a showing of "wanton 
and unnecessary infliction of pain [or conditions that are] 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime 
warranting imprisonment . . .", Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 346 (1981), or that a prison official or employee 
has acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
need. See, e.g. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Moreover, "[i]n assessing claims 
that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, 
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries spring from 
constitutional requirements. . . ." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351. 
(Internal quotation marks omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The cases cited by the Commonwealth include Doty v. County of 
Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994); O'Laughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614 
(9th Cir. 1990); Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1990); and 
Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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Accordingly, absent some indication that Congress 
intended to incorporate constitutional standards of cruel 
and unusual punishment into the procedures for filing a 
law suit in forma pauperis, Eighth Amendment analysis is 
of little assistance in determining congressional intent in 
enacting 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Our inquiry into the proper 
interpretation and application of S 1915(g) reveals no such 
intent. 
 
Rather, Congress's intent in enacting the "three strikes" 
provision was twofold. Congress was clearly concerned with 
continuing to afford in forma pauperis filing status to 
inmates who had a history suggestive of abusing the 
judicial system.7 However, Congress was also fully 
cognizant of the need to afford redress to any indigent 
prisoner whose circumstances created an "imminent danger 
of serious physical injury." Had Congress wanted to limit 
the latter concern to only those inmates who alleged a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, it would have said so. 
 
Nevertheless, even some of the language that courts have 
used in the context of an Eighth Amendment analysis 
supports our conclusion that the district court erred here. 
For example, in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34, 113 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In interpreting 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d) which allowed dismissal of a 
frivolous in forma pauperis complaint prior to enactment of the PLRA, 
the Court stated: 
 
       In enacting the federal in forma pauperis statute, Congress 
intended 
       to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied an opportunity to 
       commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or criminal, in any 
       court of the United States, solely because ... poverty makes it 
       impossible ... to pay or secure the costs of litigation. At the 
same 
       time that it sought to lower judicial access barriers to the 
indigent, 
       however, Congress recognized that a litigant whosefiling fees and 
       court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, 
       lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, 
       malicious, or repetitive lawsuits. In response to this concern, 
       Congress included subsection (d) as part of the statute, which 
       allows the courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if 
       satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. 
 
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Congress incorporated a similar balance into the 
"three strikes" provision of the PLRA. 
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S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993), the Supreme 
Court held that a claim of exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke states a cause of action for violation of the 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment even though the inmate is asymptomatic 
because the health risk posed by involuntary exposure to 
second hand smoke was "sufficiently imminent". There, the 
Court rejected the argument that a claim could not be 
established absent a claim of present injury. The Court 
stated "the Court of Appeals cases to the effect that the 
Eighth Amendment protects against sufficiently imminent 
dangers as well as current unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain and suffering are legion." Id. Thus, we will 
not read the language of S 1915(g) to require that the 
"imminent danger" allegation be accompanied by allegations 
of an existing serious physical injury in order to bring a 
prisoner within the statutory exception to the "three 
strikes" provision. It is sufficient that the condition poses 
an imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
 
This does not however, mean that a district court must 
accept any and all allegations of injury as sufficient to 
forestall application of 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Neither our 
decision here, nor our holding in Gibbs v. Roman prevents 
a district court from discrediting factual claims of imminent 
danger that are "clearly baseless," i.e., allegations that are 
fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of the"irrational 
or wholly incredible." Denton, 504 U.S. at 33, 112 S.Ct. at 
1733. We do caution, however, that the inquiry a court may 
make under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e) (allowing dismissal of 
frivolous complaints), See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 
319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), is not the 
same as the one made when there is a challenge to a claim 
of "imminent danger" under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). The latter 
is only intended to determine whether a complainant may 
proceed without full payment of filing fees. See Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). 
"Once the fee barrier has been overcome, the merits of the 
cause of action are itself available for consideration and 
decision." Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d at 87 n.7.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are mindful that this procedure will often times necessitate further 
factfinding proceedings once the imminent danger allegation is 
challenged; a byproduct of the PLRA most likely not contemplated by 
Congress, but which must nonetheless be handled by the courts. 
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III. 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the district court's 
order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
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